RETURNS TO PUBLIC INVESTMENTS
IN AGRICULTURE WITH IMPERFECT

DOWNSTREAM COMPETITION
STEPHEN F. HAMILTON AND DAVID L. SUNDING
A multiple-market framework is developed to measure the size and distribution of research
benefits. The model considers an upstream raw product market and a downstream finished product
market and allows for imperfect competition in the intermediary food-processing sector. A central
conceptual result is derived: an increase in raw product output is a sufficient condition for costreducing innovations in the farm sector to increase social welfare. A special case of linear farm
supply and isoelastic processing production functions reveals that necessary conditions for welfare
to decrease are a convergent farm supply shift, an oligopsonistic upstream market configuration,
and increasing returns-to-scale processing technology.
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A basic goal of public agricultural research is
to reduce the costs of farm production. Toward this end, governments have invested
considerable resources to improve basic scientific knowledge, develop novel technologies, and facilitate the adoption of modern
plant varieties and farming methods. Economists have generally concluded that public investments in agriculture have achieved remarkable success in lowering the marginal
cost of farm production, due in large part to
the effectiveness of land grant research and
extension activities (Chavas and Cox, Cochrane). As a result of these cost changes, public
agricultural investments have been shown to
yield impressive social rates of return in numerous studies (for a survey of this literature,
see Alston, Norton, and Pardey).
Several recent papers have shown that imperfect competition in the downstream processing sector can affect both the size and the
distribution of welfare changes. Dryburgh and
Doyle consider the impact of technical innovation in a multimarket study of the British
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dustry conditions of monopoly, monopsony,
and perfect competition and find that research
gains are smaller under monopoly. Huang and
Sexton measure market power in the Taiwan
tomato processing industry and use conjectural elasticity parameters to compare returns
to mechanical tomato harvesting with a
benchmark case of perfect competition. Recently, in the most thorough treatment of these
issues to date, Alston, Sexton, and Zhang use
a linear model with fixed proportions processing technology to examine the effect of
imperfect competition in a multimarket framework. Their essential finding is that imperfect
competition, in particular an oligopsony configuration, has a significant effect on the distribution of research benefits and a lesser impact on the corresponding total welfare
change.
The studies to date on research benefits in
imperfectly competitive markets have generally specified the effects of public research
with parallel or proportional shifts in farm
supply. The remaining possibility, that of convergent shifts, is an interesting omission in
the literature. Convergent shifts, which make
the farm supply function more inelastic, have
been considered previously by Lindner and
Jarrett in the competitive case; however, supply shifts that increase the slope of the farm
supply relation have particularly profound implications under oligopsony.

Other economists have noted that down- usual methods of evaluating research benefits
ward shifts in farm supply can reduce raw provide a significant conceptual payoff.
product use and increase farm prices in oligopsonistic industries. In particular,Chen and
Lent find that an increase in the slope of the The Model
farm supply function is a necessary condition
for a downward farm supply shift to reduce
Consider an agricultural economy consisting
industry output. Hamilton and Sunding derive of a raw
product market and a finished product
a similar result for convergent supply shifts
market. The model is comprised of three types
in long-run oligopsony equilibria and detail
of agents (farmers, processors, and consumhow farm innovation can affect downstream
concentration and market power. Our analysis ers) and two markets (a raw product market
extends this research, while recasting some of among farmers and processors and a finished
its major insights, by considering a more gen- product market among processors and coneral theoretic framework and addressing the sumers).
The processing industry is comprised of n
social welfare implications of convergent
firms.
The raw product use of processor i is
shifts in farm supply.
denoted
xi and the total raw product use in
This article develops a framework for the
is X = Si,1 xi. Similarly, Yi repthe
industry
measurement of research benefits that is more
resents
the
in
the
to
literature
output of a single processing firm
general than other analyses
date. We consider three extensions simulta- and aggregate output of the finished product
neously: (i) a wider variety of farm supply is Y = En= Yi. The production function of
shifts, (ii) a general specification of demand processor i is Yi = f(xi), where f (xi) > 0 and
and farm cost functions, and (iii) a nonde- f '(xi) < O.1The consumer price is given by
generate food processing production function the inverse demand function for the final prodthat allows for various parameterizations of uct, P(Y), with Py(Y) < 0. The farm price is
returns to scale. The analysis leads to several given by the inverse supply function for the
fundamental observations regarding the mar- raw product, W(X; 0), where 0 is a shift paginal welfare impacts of cost-reducing farm rameter that represents the level of public aginvestments. When all markets are perfectly ricultural investment. The farm supply funccompetitive, we show that a reduction in the tion satisfies Wx(X; 0) > 0 and, without loss
cost of producing the status quo level of farm of generality, we denote a downward shift in
output is both a necessary and a sufficient farm supply by the condition W5(X;0) < 0.
condition for an increase in social welfare. Strategic interaction among processors in the
Under conditions of imperfect competition, model is described by the conjectural variahowever, we uncover a result that underscores tions parameters 8i = dYldyi and iy, = dXldxi,
the importance of downstream market struc- where 5i and y,iare assumed to be constant.
ture: Social welfare can decrease even when
The processor profit function is expressed
innovation reduces the cost of producing the as
status quo level of farm output. We demonstrate that welfare can decrease in response
n
to innovation that lowers farm production
(1)
ri(Xi; O) = P > fi(Xi)
fi(xi)
costs only if the farm supply shift is converi=l
gent and the upstream raw product market is
- W(X; O)xi
characterized by oligopsony. Conversely, we
also show that an increase in farm output is
a sufficient condition for a cost-reducing farm which is defined completely over the input
choice of the firm, xi, and the exogenous polsupply shift to increase social welfare.
In the final section, the general results of icy parameter, 0. Expression (1) has the folthe model are made more transparentby con- lowing first-order condition:2
sidering a special case of linear farm supply
and isoelastic processing production technol'We consider the case of a single input to make the effects of
ogy. Another necessary condition emerges for a farm supply shift more transparent.
An extension to the case of
public research to reduce social welfare in this multiple inputs would be relatively straightforward.
2 For notational convenience, we drop all arguments from the
case: the food processing technology must exIndustry derivatives are denoted with subscripts, while
hibit increasing returns to scale. Thus, the equations.
the individual output effect of a representativeprocessor is denoted
three modifications made here to the more with a prime.
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The equilibrium is characterized completely
by the solutions {xi, i = 1, 2, . . ., n} in equation (3). That is, given the solutions in equation (3), equation (4) determines {Yi, i = 1,
2, ..., n}, equation (5) determines Y, equation (6) determines X, and equations (7) and
(8), respectively, define the market prices P
and W. The comparative statics results for an
exogenous shift in the parameter 0 are therefore captured entirely by the solutions to equation (3).
Confining attention to symmetric processor equilibria, equation (5) can be expressed
as Y = ny and equation (6) can be expressed
as X = nx. Substituting equations (5) and (6)
in equation (3), making use of equations (4),
(7), and (8), the first-order condition of a representative processor is
(9)

cI(x, n, 0)
= P[nf(x)]f'(x)

) = (1 - tri)/(1 + oE) is an inverse
measure of the processing market imperfection, q = -P'YIP is the absolute value of the
output elasticity (or price flexibility) of demand, and E = W'X/W is the output elasticity
of supply. Smaller values of ) represent greater departures from perfect competition.4 In the
competitive case, a representative processor
equates the marginal value product with the
farm price in equation (10), whereas, in noncompetitive environments, the price of the
farm product is less than the value of its marginal product in inverse proportion to the value of ).
In general, analytic solutions to equation
(9) are not possible. The effect of an arbitrary
farm supply shift on the market equilibrium
is therefore described using the implicit function theorem. Differentiating first-order condition (9) with respect to x, we have
where

The market equilibrium in the processing industry is thus described by 4 + 2n equations:
(3)

(10) Pf'6 = W

+ 8Py[nf(x)]f'(x)

X f(x) - W(nx) - yxWx(nx) = 0.
Converting the conjectural variations parameters into elasticity form, we obtain ~ = by/
Y and o = yx/X, where t, o E [0, 1], with a
value of 0 representing competition and a value of 1 representing monopoly and monopsony conduct, respectively.3
First-order condition (9) can be expressed
compactly as
3 The allowable degree of oligopoly power is limited in a model
of imperfect competition by the condition that marginal revenue be
positive. From first-ordercondition (9), this restriction implies <K
(l/n).

(11)

(>x-- f"(P + ntPyf)
+ n(f')2[(1 + P)Py+PPyf]
- n[(l + w)Wx + XWx] < 0.

Expression (11) is an industry equilibrium
condition, which, in a linear economy with
constant returns to scale, reduces to <x =
-nfl, where fl = [(1 + P)Py+ (1 + o)Wx]
is as derived analytically by Alston, Sexton,
and Zhang.
The derivative of equation (9) with respect
to 0 is =x -(Wo + oXWxo).Thus, in a market
without oligopsony power, public research affects the first-order condition of a representative processor solely through the level effect
in the farm supply function, W0, which corresponds, in the short run, to the change in
the marginal cost of farming. In a noncompetitive raw product market, public investment also affects first-order condition (9)
through the rotation effect, Wxo, or through
changes in the slope of the farm supply function. In the terminology of Lindner and Jarrett,
the rotational effect of a downward shift is
"convergent" when Wxo > 0, and it is "divergent" in the opposite case.5 The most com4
Specifically, the value of ) ranges from 1 under competition
to (1 - 'q)/(l + e) < 1 under conditions of joint monopoly and
monopsony power.
5 Note that we define these terms at the
equilibriumpoint. Generally, if the supply functions cross each other, the shift may be
convergent for one range of values and divergent for another.

mon supply shifts specified in empirical work
are parallel shifts (W, < 0 and Wx= 0) and
proportional shifts (W0 = Wx, X < 0).
The effect of public investment on a representative processor's use of farm products
is dxldO = -(O/(x. Using the aggregation
condition (6), public investment changes raw
product use in a symmetric processing industry as
(12)

dX
d

n(Wo + (oXWx)

Sectoral Impacts of Public Research
In this section, we describe the effect of an
arbitrary farm supply shift on farm surplus,
processor surplus, and consumer surplus under various industry configurations in the processing sector. We first analyze the effect of
public research on farm surplus and, in particular, on changes in the total cost of farming
associated with agricultural innovation.
At the initial equilibrium point, the total
variable cost of farm production is
x(o)

(14)
where the denominator is negative by the
equilibrium condition (11). For the case of
nonparallel shifts, expression (12) may be
written as

(13)

-dX

nXWx(E? + o)

TC(X; 0) =

W(Z, 0) dZ

which implies that public research changes
total farm production costs as follows:
(15)

dX
fx
TCO= W- +
Wo(Z, 0) dZ.
dO

where e? = Wo/XWxo,the elasticity of the shift
in farm supply, gives the proportional change
in the level effect relative to the rotation effect
of the farm supply shift. The shift elasticity
may be interpreted in terms of changes in the
marginal and average farm price. At the initial
level of output, the marginal change in the
farm price is Wx,, while the average change
in the farm price is Wo/X.Thus, the shift elasticity is the ratio of changes in the average
and marginal farm price at the initial equilibrium point. If public research reduces the
equilibrium farm price (i.e., W. < 0), the shift
elasticity is positive for divergent shifts but
negative for convergent shifts in farm supply.
Farm output can decrease in response to
public research only when the shift elasticity
is negative. In expression (13), farm output
increases in response to a parallel or divergent
shift in farm supply, regardless of the form of
competition, but decreases in response to a
convergent shift if \jE < o.6 In the next section, our discussion reveals that the shift elasticity, or, more precisely, the sign of the rotation effect, Wxo,provides a relevant focus
for the empirical investigation of research
benefits in noncompetitive food processing
environments.

The first term after the equality in equation
(15) is the change in production costs associated with the change in output, while the
integral represents the change in the cost of
producing the status quo level of output. That
is, the integrand gives the distance between
the initial and postresearch farm supply
curves. Given that the intent of public research is to lower farm production costs, we
confine attention to the case where the integral
in equation (15) has a negative value, thereby
eliminating from consideration public investments that increase the total cost of producing
the status quo level of output.7Even with such
a restriction, the effect of public research on
farm production costs is potentially ambiguous: the cost of producing the ex ante output
level declines but more units may be produced
ex post.
In the empirical examination of research
benefits, perhaps the greatest challenge is to
measure the change in production costs along
the entire length of the initial supply curve.
In principle, this change is measurable if the
functional form of the farm supply curve and
the type of shift are known. Alternatively, it
is also possible to estimate the change in the
supply relation nonparametrically, using the

6 Chen and Lent derive a similar condition for a supply disturbance to decrease raw product use under oligopsony.

7 Notice, however, that our methodology extends quite readily
to other interventions, such as environmental regulations, that increase the total cost of farm production.

microparameter method described by Sunding.8
We next examine the effect of public research on farm surplus. Farm surplus is given
as
X(o)

FS(O)

W(X, O)X-

W(Z, 0)dZ.

It follows that the effect of public investment
on farm surplus is
dFS= WxXI+WoX
dO
\dO/
rx

-

shift depends on the relative magnitudes of
the changes in farm output and farm production costs.
These findings relate to the empirical literature on changes in farm surplus under perfect competition. In the perfectly competitive
case, equation (16) implies that a necessary
condition for farm surplus to decrease is that
the farm supply shift is divergent, a familiar
result to studies that specify proportional farm
supply shifts in the measurement of research
benefits.
Processor surplus is defined as PS(0)
P[Y(O)]Y(0) - W(X; O)X(O).Differentiation
of the processor surplus measure with respect
to 0 yields

Wo(Z, ) dZ.

dPS

fo

The effect of public research on farm surplus
in equation (16) is ambiguous and depends on
supply and demand conditions, the number of
processing firms, the nature of competition in
the processing industry, and the level and rotation effect of the shift in farm supply. For
the case of a parallel supply shift, the last two
terms cancel in equation (16) and farm surplus
increases if and only if raw product use increases. From equation (12), raw product use
always increases in response to a parallel shift,
whereupon farm surplus unambiguously increases, regardless of the degree of structural
competitiveness in the processing industry.
For a divergent shift, the value of W0is greater
at the equilibrium point than at lower output
levels, which implies that the sum of the last
two terms in equation (16) is negative. Thus,
farm surplus can decline even when raw product use increases if public investment induces
a divergent shift of farm supply. For a convergent shift, the value of W. is smaller at the
equilibrium point than at lower levels of output, and the sum of the last two terms in equation (16) is positive. Hence, an increase in
raw product output is sufficient for an increase
in farm surplus following a convergent shift.
Notice, however, that raw product use can decline in equation (12) for a convergent shift
under conditions of oligopsony. With an oligopsonistic upstream raw product market, the
change in farm surplus following a convergent
8 This method decomposes the initial supply curve into its constituent regional components (e.g., each point on the supply curve
corresponds to production costs in a defined region) and calculates
changes in production costs for each region as a function of changes
in crop yields and per acre production costs.
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PyY)(dY ) -W5X
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-

(W + W,X)

Making use of the first-ordercondition (9) and
the relationship dY/dO= f'(dX/dO), it follows
that
(17)

dPS =
e
[f'PyY(1 - ) - WxX(1 - o)]
(dX

In the case of joint monopoly and monopsony
in the processing industry, the first term is
zero by the envelope theorem, and public investment unambiguously increases processor
surplus. For all other industry configurations,
expression (17) indicates that the change in
output affects processor surplus, as the first
term in equation (17) has the opposite sign of
dXldO.Thus, a contraction of raw product use
is a sufficient condition for the farm supply
shift to increase processor surplus. If raw
product use increases in response to the shift,
such as in the case of a parallel farm supply
shift, the effect of public investment on processor surplus is determined by two countervailing factors. The downward shift in farm
supply directly increases processor surplus
through the last term in equation (17). However, the shift also affects processor surplus
through the first term in equation (17), as an
increase in aggregate raw product use increases the equilibrium price of the raw product
and decreases the equilibrium price of the fin-

ished product. This latter effect is stronger
when oligopoly and oligopsony power is
small and when the farm supply shift is divergent.9
Consumer surplus is defined as
CS(O)

J

Y(O)

P(Z) dZ - P[Y(O)]Y(0).

Differentiation with respect to 0 yields dCSI
dO = -PyY(dYldO). Making the substitution
dY/dO = f'(dX/dO), we have
(18)

dCS =dXf

dO

=- P

(d

The change in consumer surplus has the same
sign as the change in raw product use in equation (12). This result indicates once again the
importance of the term Wx, in determining the
distribution of research benefits in noncompetitive environments. Under perfect competition in the processing industry, consumer
surplus increases for any downward shift in
farm supply, regardless of the rotation effect,
as competitive processors expand raw product
use in response to the shift. In noncompetitive
processing environments, public research increases consumer surplus when the farm supply shift is parallel or proportional, but immiserates consumers for convergent shifts that
induce a contraction of raw product use in
equation (12).

(19)

(dX _
dSB
-I
d- = (Pf' -W)(9)dO
dO

WH(Z;0)dZ.

In response to public innovation, social benefit increases in equation (19) following an
expansion of raw product use and a decrease
in the status quo costs of farm production. In
a competitive food processing environment,
the marginal value product of farm output
equals the raw product price by first-order
condition (9), which implies that the change
in social benefit is equal to the reduction in
total farm production costs at the initial equilibrium point. Thus, under conditions of perfect competition, a reduction in farm production costs at the initial equilibrium point is
both a necessary and a sufficient condition for
public research to increase social benefit.10
When the processing sector is imperfectly
competitive, equation (19) uncovers a fundamental result in public research: social welfare can decrease if dX/dO < 0. Thus, from
equation (12), a perverse welfare result can
emerge only in the case of a convergent farm
supply shift.
This point is particularly interesting given
the typical specifications of supply functions
employed in empirical models of research
benefits. Consider, for example, the following
commonly specified inverse supply functions:
W(X, O) = 0 + aX
W(X,

) = a + OX

W(X,

) = 0(a + 1X)

W(X, 0) = ox"

Public Research and Social Benefits

W(X, 0) = aXX

Social benefit, the sum of consumer, processor, and farm surplus, is given by

W(X, o) = (OX)

Y(9)
rX(0)

SB(0)-

P(Z)dZ -

W(Z;0) dZ.

Differentiating social benefit with respect to
0 and simplifying yields
9 The
analysis of processor surplus in the competitive case provides an interesting point of comparison between our approachand
the case of fixed proportions production technology. The specification of a fixed input-output ratio in the processing sector restricts
marginalprofit to be zero under perfect competition, which rules out
the possibility of fixed costs. Ourchoice of a more general production
function leaves open the possibility that competitive processors earn
positive profits in a short-runequilibriumand/orthat fixed costs exist
in the processing sector.

where dO < 0 for a downward shift. Each of
these functions precludes the possibility that
Wxo> 0, and thus rule out, a priori, the type
of effects that result from convergent shifts;
these include a potential contraction of industry output and a concomitant decrease in
social welfare.
Lindner and Jarrett and others have recognized the potential for public research to
induce convergent farm supply shifts. The
types of innovations most likely to result in
convergent shifts are those that lower the costs
of producing the status quo level of farm out'oThis result also appears in Sunding.

put but increase the share of fixed costs in the
crop budget. These changes reduce farm costs
while simultaneously making the farm supply
function less elastic. Indeed, one of the most
celebrated analyses of research benefits alludes to just such an outcome. In their 1970
analysis of research benefits for the mechanical tomato harvester in California, Schmitz
and Seckler find that adoption of the harvester
reduced harvest labor requirements and variable production costs while increasing fixed
costs. Subsequently, Just and Chern concluded that the adoption of the tomato harvester
made the farm supply relation more inelastic
and, hence, resulted in a convergent shift."

The Case of Linear Supply and Isoelastic
Production Technology
The methodological approach we have outlined employs general specifications of supply, demand, and processor production relationships. A special case of this framework,
therefore, is the linear economy with fixed
proportions processing technology pursued by
Alston, Sexton, and Zhang. In this section, we
present a special case that extends their analysis but which leads to quite different conclusions. In particular,we follow Alston, Sexton, and Zhang by specifying a linear farm
supply curve but consider a more general, isoelastic food production technology. We also
maintain a more general demand function,
though this difference is of little import. The
implication of the special case is that alternative specifications of the downstream production technology produce results that are
fundamentally different from the case of fixed
proportions, which clarifies an important and
heretofore unrecognized role of scale economies in the processing sector. The results underscore our earlier observation that the relationship between farm supply shifts and research returns is considerably richer than previously recognized.
For analytic convenience, we consider a
linear farm supply function and confine attention to the case of a competitive down'' We should emphasize thatthe adoptionof the tomato harvester
increased social welfare, because the large downward-level effect of
the farm supply curve dominatedthe rotationeffect of the convergent
shift. The point is, rather, that convergent shifts are an empirical
possibility.

stream finished products market.12As in the
previous section, inverse demand is P(Y),
while the farm supply function is given by
(20)

W(X; 0) = b(O) + P(O)X,

where the slope and intercept of the supply
function, 3(0) and b(0) respectively, are, at
least potentially, affected by public research.
At an initial equilibrium point, X*, we can
completely characterize a downward vertical
shift in farm supply by the condition Wo(X*)
= be + P,X* < 0, while a rotation effect in
the farm supply function is captured by the
condition Wxo= 30.Familiar supply shifts in
empirical research include the parallel downward shift, which satisfies bq < 0 and P, =
0, and the proportional divergent (or pivotal)
shift, which satisfies b, = 0 and P, < 0. The
other possibility we consider is that of a convergent shift, which is characterized by the
ons be < 0, Pe > 0, and b, + P3X* < 0.
The technology of a representative processor is given by the following isoelastic production function:
(21) y = f(x) = Axa
where xo is the production elasticity. For alternative values of the production elasticity,
equation (21) reduces to various processing
situations associated with increasing returns
to scale (a > 1), decreasing returns to scale
(a < 1), and fixed proportions (ar = 1).
Using equation (20), the first-order condition (9) becomes
(22)

= Pf' - b3b(1

+ o)X=

0.

By equation (11), the equilibrium condition is
(23)

cx = Pf" + nPy(f')2

- np(l + w) < 0.

For isoelastic production technology (21),
substituting f' = aof/x and f" = (oa - 1)f'I
x in equation (23) and simplifying yields
(24)

(x = T/x < 0

where T = {Pf'[a(l

-

q1)- 1] -

3X(1 +

12These specifications do not qualitatively affect the results described below. The objective here is to examine research returnsin
an analytically convenient multimarketframework, the simplest of
which combines a generalized productionfunction in the processing
industry with a competitive market-clearingcondition in the downstream finished product industry.

o))}. Applying the implicit function theorem
to equation (22), we obtain
(25)

dX_
O
dO

(28)

+ E0(2Wo2pX + T)]/2T

X[b, + P1X(1 + o)]

From equation (20), the total cost of farm production is the area under the supply function
rx

(b + PZ) dZ.

TC(X) =
fo

Hence, in response to public innovation, the
change in the total cost of producing the status
quo level of farm output is

where the shift elasticity, E0, is as described
in the previous section. Inspection of equation
(28) reveals that public research increases social benefit when the term in square brackets
is positive. The first term in this bracket is
positive by equation (24). Thus, for a convergent shift of farm supply (e < 0), social
welfare can only decrease when the shift elasticity is relatively large (in absolute value) and
when market circumstances satisfy the inequality T + 2(()223X* > 0. Substitution of
T reveals that a necessary condition for a per-

verse welfare effect to occur in equation (28)
is
(29)

(26)

Wo(Z, 0) dZ = (b0X2 +

f

0X2)/2.

fo

In equation (26), the total cost of producing
the status quo level of farm output decreases
for a convergent shift in farm supply (P, '
0), as (b, + P0X/2) < (b, + 0OX)< 0. Total
farming costs also decrease for a parallel or
proportional farm supply shift, although a divergent shift that reduces the equilibrium farm
price may increase the cost of producing the
status quo level of farm output. This result
occurs if b0 > 0 and -foX/2 < bo < - ,.
Substituting equation (25) and equation
(26) into equation (19) for the change in social
benefit yields
(27)

dSB =
dH
WoX[2(WoX- t)
dO

dSB
= X{2opX[b, + PeX(1 + o)]
dO
- '(2b0 + P,X)}/24

where the denominator is negative by equation (24). In a competitive environment, equation (27) reduces to dSB/dO = -X(bo + eoX/
2), which is positive for a cost-decreasing
farm supply shift, as in the general model. It
follows directly that public research reduces
social benefit only in the case of an upstream
oligopsony configuration and a convergent
farm supply shift.
Evaluating equation (27) at the equilibrium
point and substituting the definitions W0 = b0
+ P3X* and Wxo= P3, yields, after some simplification,

Pf'[a(l

- n) - 1]

> PX*[(l

-

02) + (1 -

o)].

- 1, it follows
Noting that o
immediately that
the right-hand side of equation (29) is (at least
weakly) positive. Therefore, necessary conditions for a convergent farm supply shift to
reduce social benefits are o > 0 and xa(l ql)> 1.
The implication of the special case is that
a convergent farm supply shift can reduce social welfare only when the processing technology satisfies a > 1, which corresponds to
a situation of increasing returns to scale in the
food processing industry. Moreover, the range
of circumstances in which public research
yields negative social returns increases with
the value of a. This finding highlights the potential quantitative and qualitative bias in the
calculation of social benefits when a degenerate processing production function is specified in food processing environments that are
not, in fact, characterized by constant returns
to scale.
Conclusion
This article develops a general framework for
calculating of the size and distribution of research benefits. The framework distinguishes
between the farm product and final product
markets with a processing production function, employs general supply and demand
functions, and considers broad classes of farm
supply shifts.
The results reinforce the importance of as-

sumptions about competitive conditions and
the specification of supply shifts when measuring the size and distribution of research
benefits. In particular, when the downstream
processing industry is imperfectly competitive, the welfare implications of cost-reducing
innovation are sensitive to changes in the
slope of the farm supply relation. Public investment that lowers the total cost of farming
always increases aggregate welfare under perfect competition but may actually reduce welfare for convergent shifts when the downstream food processing industry is imperfectly competitive.
The nature of food processing technology
is also important. A special case of the model
reveals that necessary conditions for public
research to result in perverse welfare changes
is an oligopsony upstream market configuration and increasing returns to scale in the processing industry. The potential for substantial
scale economies in the highly concentrated
food processing sector favors the implementation of more general farm supply shifts and
more flexible processor production relationships in future analyses of research benefits.
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